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Abstract 
In Germany 1,41 children are born per women which results in a much lower birth-rate than 
in France. Time and again it has been discussed if a family orientated tax- and transfer system 
can influence birth rates. In Germany, France is often designated as a role model. Based on a 
model calculation this contribution shows how disposable income of German families would 
change, if the French tax- and transfer system were introduced. It will be distinguished among 
different family and employment compositions. One of the results is that families with only 
one child would be financially worth of under the French system while families with more 
children would benefit. 
Introduction 
In Germany 1,41 children are born per women which results in a much lower birth-rate than 
in France. Additionally many families in Germany, especially single mothers are at risk of 
poverty. In the literature it has often been discussed if a family orientated tax- and transfer 
system can influence birth rates. Empirical evidence, however, is rare. Announcements that 
the 2007 introduced parental allowance (Elterngeld) would have led to increased birth rates in 
Germany have turned out to be premature.  
In Germany, the tax- and transfer system of France is often designated as role model. With a 
birth rate of 1.98. France holds a leading position in the European birth statistics (indexmundi 
2008).1
                                                 
1 These are birth rates for 2008. In 2008 Germany`s birth rate was 1.41 (indexmundi 2008). 
 However, we do not postulate a causal relationship between birth-rates and family 
benefits. For making such claims, the relation are too complex and the social structure and 
historical developments too different. Our contribution can rather be seen as an important 
 
prerequisite for further investigations.  Based on a model calculation this contribution shows 
how disposable income of German families would change, if the French tax- and transfer 
system were introduced. It will be distinguished among different family and employment 
compositions. Especially it will be shown, how the disposable of different family types 
changes if Germany would introduce the French tax system. Moreover, the German child 
benefit will be substituted by the French child benefit. Different family compositions range 
from married couples without kids to married couples with two kids. Furthermore it will be 
distinguished if both, one or none of the parents is employed. 
Below the most important monetary benefits for families of the two countries will be 
introduced. The amounts are the benefits as they were paid to families in 2009. Also the 
model calculations presented in chapter 3 are based on these figures. 
Monetary Benefits for Families 
According to German income tax law married couples can choose between individual or joint 
taxation. In the case of individual taxation the income tax rate will be applied to each income 
separately.2
1. The taxable income will be calculated and halved. 
 If instead choosing the joint taxation, the following procedure applies: 
2. For the half taxable income the tax rate will be determined and the income tax 
calculated. 
3. The calculated income tax will then be doubled to yield the joint income tax payments. 
Choosing joint taxation, the ability to pay principle will not be applied to each spouse 
separately but instead to the marriage as economic community. 
In France couples are assessed for taxation independent of their family status. Here a family 
splitting applies which implies that even children influence the resulting income tax 
payments. Not only the taxable income of the spouses will be calculated but the taxable 
income of all family members. The income tax payments in France are calculated as follows: 
1. Calculating household income. 
2. Calculating the quotiente familiale, which results form Table 1. 
3. Dividing the household income by the quotiente familiale. 
4. Applying the income tax rate on the calculated amount. 
5. Multiplying the just calculated income tax by the quotiente familiale.   
                                                 
2 In Germany income tax rates are progressive. Which means that tax rates increase with income. 
Table 1: Weighting factors family splitting in France 
Number of 
Children 
0 1 2 3 4 
Single 1 1 1,5 2 3 
Couple 2 2,5 3 4 5 
Source: Service Public 2010 
The procedure of this method is similar to the joint taxation in Germany with the distinction 
that the number of family members reduce the progressivity of the income tax. This splitting 
advantage is limited for the first two children to 2,159 € each and for each additional child to 
4,318 € a year (Bünnagel 2006). 
Further instruments to support families financially are the child benefit and tax-exempt 
amounts (Kinderfreibetrag). Each year individuals subject to income taxation can deduct a tax 
exemption worth 1,932 € (2,184 € since 2010) from their tax liability for each child. This tax 
exempt amount mirrors the neuter subsistence level of a child. Alongside a tax exemption for 
upbringing, education and care worth 1,080€ (1,320€ since 2010) is possible. For spouses 
who decide to practice joint taxation these amounts are doubled. Therefore parents can 
receive a tax exemption worth 6,024 € per child.  
Closely linked to the just described tax-exemptions for children are the child benefits 
(Kindergeld) of which the amounts are presented in Table 2. In Germany families either 
receive the child benefit or the tax-exemption depending on which is more advantageous. 
Independently from the family splitting in France families with more than one child receive a 
child benefit (Table 2). 
In both countries there are of course more monetary transfers to families. France pays an 
child-raising allowance of 552 € per month, for which parents are entitled if they take parental 
leave. Caring parents are granted parental leave if they have worked at least two years before 
the child was born. Families with only one child have the right for six months parental leave 
while families with at least two children can take three years. In Germany a parental benefit 
has been introduced instead which is 67% of net income earned before birth. This is at least 
300 € but not more than 1.800 € which is paid for 12 months and can be extended two months 
if the partner also takes parental leave for at least two months. Independent of parental 
benefits each parent is entitled for a maximum of three years of parental leave. 
 
Table 2: Child benefits and tax treatment of labour income3 
 
Source: MISSOC 2009, Child benefits and tax-exemption as they applied in 2009. 
In France the introduction of parental benefits has been discussed as well. Women shall join 
the labour force earlier after giving birth and father shall be motivated to take parental leave 
with a high income replacement rate (Salles 2009). Further financial support which families in 
France are entitled to are the birth-benefit of 890 € in the 7th month of pregnancy and a basic-
support of 179 € until the third birthday of the child. This basic-support is dependent on 
income but according to Salles (2009) about 85% of the families receive this benefit. 
A substantial cost factor for families is often the external care of their children. From the age 
of three children in France have a statutory right for external care. For 14% of the children 
below the age of three care in the kindergarten or other day care opportunities are available. 
Admittedly, as in Germany also in France families complain about missing day care 
opportunities and flexibility. The costs for external care are subsidized on average by 90% 
such than parent have to pay only 10% of the costs. At the age of two but more often at the 
age of three many children are cared for in the école maternelle which is largely at no charge 
for the parents. If parents employ a state approved childminder, they are entitled to numerous 
forms of financial support. Thus the government takes over 100% of social contributions for 
the childminder. Other expenses for childminders will be considered when filing income taxes 
an additionally it is possible to apply for a means tested monthly support of 442 € (Salles 
2009). 
In Germany parents also have a statutory right for external care for their children from the age 
of three. However, this statutory right only includes half day care, either in the morning or in 
the afternoon. A study of the family journal “Eltern” (2008) has shown that contributions for 
half day care for three to six years old for half day care varies from 0 € to 333 € depending of 
were the parents live. For younger children the costs are mostly higher. If both parents or lone 
                                                 
3 In 2010 child benefits in Germany were increased by 20 € and the tax exempt amount has been increases to 
4,368 €. 
parents are employed they can deduct two thirds, a maximum of 4,000 € a year, of the costs 
for external care of children from the age of 0 to 14 as income-related expenses. If only one 
parent is employed, it is possible to deduct costs for day care for the three to six years old as 
special expenses.  
Figure 1: Family- and Employment Compositions 
 
In the following chapter it will be shown how the disposable income of the nine in Figure 1 
shown family constellations change, if one would introduce the French tax system or the 
French child benefit in Germany. All other family benefits discussed above will not be 
considered yet.  
Changes in disposable income due to the introduction of the French tax- and transfer 
system 
Table 3 shows which financial consequences German married couples face if the French Tax- 
and Transfer system would have been applied. Thus the introduction of the family splitting 
(Table 3) in Germany would not influence disposable income for married couples without 
children. Joint taxation as practiced in Germany and the French family splitting both lead to 
joint taxation of the couple which means that the couple’s joint income will be halved to 
determine the applicable tax rate. Income changes would appear with the birth of the first 
child. In this case the child would be part of the quotiente familale with a weight of ½. Due to 
progressive income taxation in Germany parents would benefit from a resulting lower tax rate 
which reduces the payable tax liability. The higher the parents taxable income, the larger the 
tax savings due to the French family splitting. Clearly this effect can be observed form 
couples with one child. Table 3 shows that a full-time employed couple would have a 188 € 
higher yearly disposable income if the family splitting and the French child benefit would 
have been applied. The other two family compositions would be worse off under the French 
system. This observation does not mean that family splitting would have negative effects for 
families with lower income but in fact that no child benefits are paid for the first child after 
the French system. Introducing only the family splitting and keeping the German child benefit 
would mean 95.50 € extra per month for a family with one income earner.4
Table 3: Changes in disposable income due to the introduction of   
  the French tax- and transfer-system * 
 Considering now 
couples with two children, the situation changes. It is still the families with a high income 
who profit the most but still even the other two family constellations would benefit from the 
introducing the French system. 
  Implementing tax- Implementing Implementing  
  and transfer system Tax system only child benefit only  
Couple no child        
 both full-time 0 0 0  
 full-time/part-time 0 0 0  
 one full-time 0 0 0  
Couple one child     
 both full-time 188 2,256 -2,068**  
 full-time/part-time -473 1,495 -1,968  
 one full-time -822 1,146 -1,968  
Couple two children     
 both full-time 672 3,121 -2,448  
 full-time/part-time 469 2,918 -2,448  
 one full-time 91 2,540 -2,448  
* Calculations based on the socio-economic-Panel and monetary benefits as they were paid in 2009. The stated amounts are 
changes in the disposable yearly household income due to implementing the French tax- and or transfer-system. 
**This change is higher than in the other two employment constellations (full-time/part-time, one full-time) because in the case of 
both working full-time, the tax exempt amount is applied instead of the child benefit. 
 
 
                                                 
4 95.50 € are calculated based on Tabel 3: 1,146 € devided by 12. 
 
Conclusion 
In general the introduction of the French family splitting and child benefit would lead to a 
lower disposable income for German families with one child. The situation is different for 
families with two children because these families would generally benefit from the 
introduction of the French system. A couple where one partner is working full-time and one 
partner part-time, earning an average income, for example would have about 54 € extra per 
month. These findings can be ascribed to the fact that no child benefits are paid for the first 
child. Introducing only the French family splitting and keeping the German child benefit 
would mean an additional 96 € per month for a family with one income earner and one child. 
Similar results are found in a contribution by Wrohlich et al. (2005) who investigated the 
redistributive effects of the tax-system in Germany and France for families. They conclude 
that both the redistribution between households of different size as well as of households of 
different income is more pronounced in Germany than in France.  
Finally, it is hardly possible to infer something about the effective financial burden for 
different family types based only on different tax systems or the amount of child benefit. The 
model calculations merely show, how, under German circumstances, disposable income of 
German households’ changes if the French tax-system or child-benefit were introduced. Other 
kinds of financial support and institutional differences like the social-insurance system and 
child care remain unconsidered. Scholars discovered that countries that employ family policy 
as an instrument of employment policy or equal opportunity policy for men and women often 
have a higher fertility rate than other countries (Neyer 2003). In France great importance is 
attached to labor force participation of women. Thus countries in which there is a good 
reconciliation of work and family life often also have more offspring (Gauthier 2007). These 
reasons and the fact that France especially supports families with more than one child may 
also explain the high fertility rate in France. 
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